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17 May 2008 
Abstract 
This paper presents a tour of welfare reforms in the UK since the last change of 
government, summarising the most important changes in active labour market policies 
(ALMPS), and in measures intended to strengthen financial incentives to work. It 
argues that developments in the UK’s active labour market policies occurred in two 
broad phases: first, the Government sought to strengthen ALMPs for those individuals 
deemed to be unemployed, through the New Deal programme. Second, the Government 
has reformed benefits for individuals traditionally viewed as inactive and thus excused 
job search activity, such as lone parents, and the sick and disabled. Accompanying these 
have been changes to direct taxes, tax credits and welfare benefits aiming to strengthen 
financial work incentives. However, financial work incentives have been strengthened 
by less than might be expected given the early rhetoric: the expansion in family-based 
tax credits have weakened the financial work incentives of (potential) second earners in 
families with children, many more workers now face combined marginal tax and tax 
credit withdrawal rates in excess of 60 per cent than a decade ago, and a desire to 
achieve broad reductions in relative child poverty has led the Government to increase 
substantially income available to non-working families with children. We also 
summarise evaluations of three important UK welfare-to-work reforms (WFTC, NDYP 
and Pathways to Work), but without comparing their efficacy.  
Keywords: Welfare reform, Tax credits 
JEL-codes: I38, H53 
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2  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 This paper gives a partial and brief overview of reforms to welfare to work policies 
(sometimes shortened to “welfare reforms”) in the UK since 1997, the year that the New 
Labour party formed the government. The aim has been to describe some of the key 
policies, discuss the impact of policies on a (small) number of employment-related 
indicators, but also summarise some of the more thorough econometric evaluations of 
particular welfare reforms (although with no attempt to compare the policies discussed).  
Section 1 gives some details of the main measures: reforms to what can be thought of 
as active labour market policies (ALMP), and then reforms to taxes and benefits aimed 
at strengthening financial work incentives. Section 2 shows what happened to financial 
work incentives and some employment and poverty outcomes that could be thought of 
as success measures for welfare reforms. Section 3 summarises the results of 
econometric evaluations of Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), the New Deal for 
Young People (NDYP), and the new Pathways to Work pilot (for recipients of 
incapacity benefit), arguably the three most important changes since 1997. Section 4 
concludes.  
1  Main welfare to work reforms – description 
In this section, we give an overview of the various aspects of welfare to work policies, 
or other policies expected to have a significant impact on groups on welfare.
1 
1.1  Active labour market policies 
The centrepiece of the Labour Government’s welfare to work reforms in its first few 
years was the New Deal. In the general policy parlance, the New Deal represents a 
strengthening of the ALMP applicable to recipients of out-of-work benefits. There are a 
number of New Deals aimed at different groups on welfare, each with differing 
eligibility requirements and varying degrees of compulsion. For example, the New Deal 
for Young People is compulsory for all those under 25 who have been unemployed for 6 
months; the New Deals for Lone Parents (NDLP), by contrast, are voluntary 
                                                 
1 An early exposition of the current Government’s priorities for welfare reform can be found in HM Treasury (1997); 
a more recent one is Department for Work and Pensions (2006). Reassuringly, the two have much in common. 
IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007  3 programmes that offer only advice and support, with no threat of financial sanctions. 
NDYP, therefore, places significant restrictions on the behaviour of young long-term 
unemployed as well as offering extra support; NDLP, though, represents only additional 
support. As we discuss later, this reflects that lone parents are, at the time of writing, 
excused from having to claim a benefit for the unemployed until their children are all 
aged 16 or more. 
1.1.1  New Deal for Young People (18 to 24) 
The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was introduced across the UK in April 1998; 
before this time, there was no specific programme for young unemployed people, only 
for the long-term unemployed. Participation in NDYP is compulsory for all young 
people aged between 18 and 24 who have been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
for at least six months, and involves up to four months of extensive assistance with job 
search from a personal advisor. If participants have not found employment by the end of 
this “gateway” period, then they are offered up to four options, all of which seek to 
improve their employability (these are: subsidised job placement with training, 
education, voluntary or environmental work). By the end of 2004, there have been 
almost 1.2 million completed spells on NDYP. 38 per cent of participants left for 
sustained
2 unsubsidised jobs, 11 per cent transferred to other benefits, 20 per cent have 
left for other known reasons, while the remaining 31 per cent for unknown reasons. 
1.1.2  New Deal for 25 Plus 
The national New Deal 25 Plus programme (ND25+) was originally launched in June 
1998 and reformed in April 2001. The programme focuses upon the long-term 
unemployed with mandatory participation for all individuals who have been claiming 
JSA for 18 of the last 21 months. The programme now shares common features with the 
NDYP, beginning with an initial “gateway” period lasting for up to four months, 
followed by an “Intensive Activity Period” (IAP) typically lasting for no more than 26 
weeks. The IAP includes flexible packages of support which can combine work 
experience/placements, work focused training and help with motivation and soft skills.  
                                                 
2 A sustained job is defined as one lasting for more than 13 weeks. 
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plus and New Deal for Partners 
These are all voluntary programmes open to different groups of the inactive or 
unemployed (New Deal for Partners is aimed at non-working partners of benefit 
recipients). Participants in the programme are assigned a personal advisor, who 
generally assists with a range of job search activities. 
1.1.4 Jobcentre  Plus 
A key operational change introduced by the government was the merger of the two 
agencies individually responsible for employment services and administration of social 
security benefits into one body known as Jobcentre Plus (administration of social 
security benefits for those aged 60 and over has been given to another agency). As well 
as reducing government’s administrative costs and claimants’ compliance costs, the aim 
was to allow the Government to place greater emphasis on getting benefit claimants 
back to work, even for those receiving a benefit for the inactive (who therefore face no 
requirement to look for work), such as lone parents and those with ill-health or 
disabilities.  
1.1.5  Pathways to Work 
In line with the trend for later reforms to focus on those recipients of benefits 
supposedly designed for the inactive, since October 2003 the Government has been 
piloting reforms which both provide greater support (financial and non-financial) and 
impose greater obligations to encourage claimants of incapacity benefits to move into 
paid work. These are known as the “Pathways to Work” reforms. The Government has 
already committed to extending the reforms across the UK by 2008, and set a long-term 
target to reduce the number of individuals claiming incapacity benefits by 1 million 
within ten years (Department for Work and Pensions 2006).  
Like other OECD countries, the numbers of individuals claiming incapacity benefits 
have risen considerably in recent years, more than trebling in GB over the last quarter of 
a century. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, despite the replacement in April 1995 of 
Invalidity Benefit with Incapacity Benefit – which was designed to have a more 
stringent health test – the number of claimants of these benefits aged under the State 
IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007  5 Pension Age has continued to grow over the last ten years, albeit at a slower rate than 
over the previous ten years, chiefly because of a sharp rise in female claimants. 
Figure 1 Number of claimants of Invalidity and Incapacity Benefit aged under the State 
Pension Age, May 1980 to February 2005 (thousands) 














































































Source: Department for Work and Pensions (taken from Adam et al 2006). 
 
Many individuals receiving Incapacity Benefit do so for a long time. As stated in the 
recent Department of Work and Strategy five year strategy (Department for Work and 
Pensions 2007), on average those claiming the benefit for more than twelve months end 
up claiming for eight years (Department for Work and Pensions 2005). The reforms 
being piloted are motivated by concerns that the current arrangements do not do enough 
(indeed, do nothing at all) to encourage claimants back into paid work or help them 
manage their health condition (a detailed discussion can be found in the Green Paper 
which proposed the pilots: Department for Work and Pensions 2002). 
The Pathways to Work package of reforms for new claimants of incapacity benefits 
includes three aspects: mandatory monthly work-focused interviews during the first six 
months (those with particularly serious medical conditions are exempted) a set of 
health-related and labour market programmes, and increased financial support and 
incentives, with a new Return to Work Credit paying GBP 40 a week for the first year 
of paid employment after leaving incapacity benefits if gross annual earnings are below 
GBP 15,000.  
6  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 1.1.6 Lone  parents 
The treatment of lone parents within the welfare system deserves particular attention for 
a number of reasons. First, the UK has internationally high proportions of families with 
children headed by a lone parent (currently 25 per cent, with longitudinal data 
suggesting that one third of mothers will spend some time as a lone mother before all 
her children are aged 18). Second, lone parents tend to have relatively poor skills, and 
those in work tend to work part-time for relatively low wages, and so whether working 
or not, they make up a significant proportion of the group likely to be affected by 
welfare reforms. Third, the UK has very generous (by international standards) rules for 
lone parents who claim welfare benefits: at the time of writing, lone parents in the UK 
are excused from all job-search requirements until their youngest child reaches 16. 
Partly as a consequence of the latter two points, fewer than half of lone parents were in 
work in 1997, and relative poverty rates for children in lone parent families were much 
higher than children in couple families.
3  
Many of the changes to tax credits, minimum wage, and childcare policies (described 
in Section 1.2) have been of particular help to lone parents. But it is only very recently 
that the Government has proposed increasing the requirements asked of lone parents on 
welfare, with a proposal that lone parents should have to engage in job-search as a 
condition of receiving benefit when their youngest child reaches 7. Previous reforms 
had the stated aim of making the NDLP more effective and more accessible, requiring 
lone parents to meet at least annually with a personal adviser (case worker), and had 
introduced a time-limited in-work bonus.
4  
1.2  Changes to financial incentives to work 
This section describes the main ways in which the current UK Government has sought 
to strengthen financial work incentives for those with low earning power, discussing the 
minimum wage, personal tax changes and then changes to in-work benefits and tax 
credits. 
                                                 
3 See Brewer et al (2007b). 
4 This is much like the Return to Work bonus: it pays £40 a week, for up to 12 months duration, to lone parents who 
have been on welfare for at least a year and then leave welfare to get a job. Early evaluation results, though, show 
very small impacts on labour market outcomes: Brewer et al (2007a). 
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In April 1999, a national minimum wage (NMW) was introduced in the UK at a rate of 
GBP 3.00 per hour for those aged 18-21 (the development rate) and at the higher rate of 
GBP 3.60 per hour for those aged 22 and over (Table 1). In Spring 1998, before the 
NMW was introduced, the Office for National Statistics estimated that 1.3 million 
individuals were paid wages below these introductory rates.
5 By the following year, the 
number of individuals who were estimated to be paid below these rates had fallen to a 
little under half a million, and since then the number of individuals paid below the 
operating national minimum wage rates has been relatively stable, fluctuating slightly 
between about 230,000 and 340,000.
6 The value of the minimum wage relative to the 
economy-wide average hourly wage rate has been increasing: in 1999, the main rate was 
equivalent to 36.8 per cent (47.0 per cent) of the mean (median) wage in that year, but 
by 2004 it was worth 39.8 per cent (51.9 per cent) of the respective mean (median) 
wage.  
Table 1 The UK’s minimum wage (GBP) 
Rates effective from  Main rate  Develop. rate  Median wage  Mean wage 
April  1999  3.60 3.00 7.66 9.79 
October 2000  3.70 3.20 7.93  10.22 
October 2001  4.10 3.50 8.28  10.78 
October 2002  4.20 3.60 8.62  11.35 
October 2003  4.50 3.80 8.95  11.73 
October 2004  4.85 4.10 9.35  12.18 
October 2005  5.05 4.25 9.56  12.50 
October 2006  5.35 4.45 9.95  13.00 
October  2007  5.52  4.60   
Notes: Main rate paid to workers aged 22 years and older. Development rate paid to workers aged 18-21 years 
inclusive and workers aged 22 years and above who starting a new job with a new employer and doing accredited 
training. From October 2004 a new rate of GBP 3.00 per hour was introduced. This applies to all 16 year olds who 
are no longer of compulsory school age, and 17 year olds. Mean and median wages are for all adult employees. 
Source: Low Pay Commission website (http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/). Mean and Median wages: derived from ASHE 
and taken from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=13101.  
 
In general, a binding minimum wage should increase the gap between in-work and 
out-of-work incomes for low-skilled groups, and so induce an increase in labour supply. 
                                                 
5 Office for National Statistics (2004a). 
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uneconomic to employ. Dickens and Manning (2002) find that virtually all of the 
impact of the NMW on the distribution of wages occurred within the first two months of 
its introduction, and the impact on employment seems to have been small (see, for 
example, Machin and Wilson 2004, or Stewart 2004). The impact on welfare to work 
policies may, then, be limited, but the Government now sees the minimum wage as an 
essential backstop to low wages, particularly to help prevent the incidence of in-work 
support (see Section 2.2) being entirely on employers.  
1.2.2  Personal tax changes 
In the current Government’s first parliamentary term, a series of changes were made to 
income tax and social insurance contributions (called National Insurance in the UK) 
which particularly affected low-paid workers, and which were (correctly) described by 
the Government as improving financial gains to working for the low-wage. Compared 
with the changes to financial work incentives arising from the Working Families’ Tax 
Credit, the impact of these changes was much smaller on any individual’s financial 
incentives, but affecting many more workers. To save space, they are not described 
further here.
7 
1.2.3  In-work benefit reform  
Since 1997, there have been two sets of changes to in-work benefits (or tax credits). The 
first of these (in October 1999; the replacement of a programme called family credit 
with one called Working Families’ Tax Credit) was motivated by concerns to improve 
the incentives for (some) low-earning parents to be in work. The rationale for the 
second set of reforms (in April 2003, which introduced the child and working tax 
credits) is less clear, though, and most domestic attention since 2003 has been devoted 
to operational issues of implementing a tax credit assessed on combined family income 
given the constraints of an income tax system that is individually assessed. 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Individuals can be paid less than the minimum wage either through genuine non-compliance, or through errors in 
the household surveys on which these estimates are based. 
7 See HM Treasury (1998) for the report recommending some of these change, and Myck (2000) and Gregg et al 
(1999) for analysis. One of these changes, however – a lower rate of income tax (10 per cent) on the first GBP 2,000 
of income – has since been removed in favour of a lower basic rate of tax (which was 23 per cent in 1997, and is due 
to be 20 per cent by 2008): this was announced in the 2007 Budget (HM Treasury 2007). 
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In October 1999, a programme called family credit was replaced by Working Families’ 
Tax Credit (WFTC). In the jargon, WFTC was a “refundable” tax credit, i.e. payable 
even if it exceeded the family’s income tax liability. To be entitled, at least one adult in 
a family with children must work at least 16 hours a week. So-called “hours rules” are a 
pervasive feature in the UK welfare benefit system, and have since spread into in-work 
tax credits.
8  
There is a basic credit for each family plus additions for each child, and this is 
withdrawn once earnings exceed a disregard. The phase-out or withdrawal rate in 
WFTC was 55 per cent, but this applies to earnings after income tax and social 
insurance have been deducted, so the usual overall marginal deduction rate for someone 
receiving WFTC was 69 per cent.
9 
In operational terms, there was little difference between WFTC and its predecessor, 
family credit (FC): for example, WFTC was still subject to strict capital rules, like all 
welfare benefits in the UK. The one high-profile operational difference, though, was 
that WFTC was administered by the tax authority (not the agency responsible for social 
security benefits), and, except where couples with children requested it to be paid to a 
non-working adult, was paid to individuals through employers.  
However, the more important difference with FC was that WFTC was substantially 
more generous, with a higher earnings disregard, a lower withdrawal rate, more 
generous entitlements, and a subsidy for childcare expenditures.
10 Overall, these 
changes substantially increased in-work incomes for eligible families, and the number 
of eligible families, and the WFTC was approximately twice as expensive as its 
immediate predecessor: Figure 2 shows that expenditure on employment tax credits 
almost doubled between 1998-99 and 2000-01, going from GBP 2.68 billion to GBP 
                                                 
8 Theoretically, they allow for a closer targeting on low wages, rather than low earners, but this must be traded off 
against the increased complexity of design and administration and the need for monitoring/compliance checks. 
9 In 2000/1, for example, income tax was 22 per cent and employee payroll tax was 10 per cent. Of the 68 per cent of 
any increase in earnings retained by the employee after these taxes, 55 per cent was lost in foregone WFTC, so the 
combined withdrawal rate was 0.32+0.55*(1-0.32) = 69 per cent. Families also in receipt of means-tested benefits 
that help with rents or local taxes (known, respectively, as housing benefit and council tax benefit), would, though, 
face higher rates than these. 
10  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 4.81 billion in constant 2002 prices. There was a further substantial increase by 2002, to 
GBP 6.46 billion.  
While reducing the marginal withdrawal rate of those who would have been eligible 
for Family Credit, this change also increased the numbers of workers who faced a tax 
credit withdrawal as their earnings rose on top of income tax and social insurance, and 
so the number of workers facing marginal withdrawal rates in excess of 60 per cent (the 
top income tax rate in the UK is 40 per cent) has risen accordingly (from 0.8m to 1.7m: 
this is discussed further in Section 5.1). As we shall see later, the fact that WFTC is 
assessed on the joint income of a couple means that, as more families with children 
became entitled to it, so did incentives to work for many potential second (and mostly 
female) workers weaken. 































































WFTC DPTC FC DWA  
Note: DPTC – disabled person’s tax credit. DWA – disability working allowance. WFTC replaced FC in October 
1999, so there was expenditure on both of them during the 1999-2000 tax year.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
1.2.5  Phase 2: the child and working tax credits 
Tax credits were further reformed in 2003 with the introduction of child tax credit 
(CTC) and working tax credit (WTC), in what was the biggest change in support for 
children since the introduction of child benefit in 1977. The CTC merged together 
several parts of the tax and benefit system that supported families with children, while 
                                                                                                                                               
10 The UK has a mixed-economy provision of childcare; many low-income families with children would be paying 
for work-related childcare from self-employed (but regulated) childminders, private or not-for-profit day nurseries, or 
after-school clubs. 
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WTC, like WFTC, are refundable tax credits. 
This reform was not primarily motivated by strengthening work incentives: in fact, 
there were minimal changes to budget constraints in April 2003. Instead, the reforms 
entirely overhauled the administration of tax credits, bringing them closer to the income 
tax system in terms of concepts and definitions (so tax credits now depend upon annual 
income as defined for income tax purposes) but keeping their administration and 
payment mechanisms separate from income tax.
11  
The current set of tax credits probably illustrate the Government’s frustration with 
both the income tax and the welfare system as ways of targeting financial support: the 
income tax system does not allow sufficiently accurate targeting, and traditional means-
tested benefits are seen as unacceptably complicated and stigmatising, and inappropriate 
for a programme that covers the vast majority of families with children. But tax credits 
have experienced considerable and widely-reported administrative difficulties ever since 
computer problems caused substantial delays to payments to many families in the first 
few months of 2003-04. Because of this, much policy attention since 2003 has been on 
improving their operation, rather than the inherent work incentives. In fact, as we argue 
later, the current pattern of changes to entitlements to tax credits is weakening, rather 
than strengthening, work incentives.  
A more significant change economically in 2003 was that, for the first time in the 
UK, additional support was offered to families without children who were in work but 
on a low income, through the WTC. This is less generous than it is for families with 
children: those without children have to be aged 25 or over, to work full-time, and to be 
on very low wages. Around 320,000 families without children receive the working tax 
credit, but take-up (programme participation) is extremely low, less than 1 in 5.
12 Given 
that this take-up rate is so much lower than amongst families with children, the most 
plausible explanation is that tax credits for working adults without children are still 
novel, and information and awareness about them still low. 
                                                 
11 See Brewer (2003) for amplification of these points. 
12 HM Revenue and Customs (2007). 
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This Government’s changes to taxes and benefits affecting families with children have 
by no means all been to encourage work: a concern to reduce child poverty in broad 
terms has led the Government to increase substantially the additional amounts payable 
for children in welfare benefits (before 2003) and amounts payable in the non-work-
contingent child tax credit (after 2003). Both these directly weaken incentives to work, 
as we discuss below.  
1.2.7  Work-related childcare  
Work-related childcare in the UK is provided by public and private suppliers, but the 
extent of Government intervention into this mixed market has increased dramatically 
since 1997, with the aims of expanding labour supply choices, improving work-life 
balance for parents but also advancing the long-term social and educational outcomes of 
children.  
The main policy for achieving the first of these has been to make substantially more 
generous parental subsidies for spending on formal childcare (i.e. nurseries, after-school 
clubs, childminders, but not for informal payments to friends and families) that are 
directly paid to parents in work, with the current incarnation of this programme known 
as the childcare tax credit.
13 In real terms, spending on the childcare tax credit in 
December 2004 was more than 16 times greater than spending on its equivalent in 
November 1998. Although this large increase in subsidy presumably encourages parents 
to use formal childcare rather than informal childcare, the impact on maternal labour 
supply is less clear. There has been no direct evaluation, and a review of US studies 
suggests that the elasticity of maternal labour supply to the price of childcare is very 
low.
14 
There have also been changes to the provision of early education, and considerable 
supply-side interventions to increase the amount of childcare places provided by the 
non-government sector: these are discussed more in Brewer et al (2005).  
                                                 
13 See Brewer et al (2005) for further details of the topics presented below. 
14 See Brewer and Paull (2004) and studies cited there. 
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The intention of this section is to give an overview of the key welfare to work changes 
since 1997. In the area of ALMPs, the UK Government first expanded the role of 
ALMPs for those people on benefits traditionally considered to be unemployed through 
the New Deal; more recent reforms – which are still incomplete – are aiming to get back 
to work welfare recipients traditionally considered to be inactive, and therefore excused 
from job search requirements (the sick and disabled, and lone parents). These changes 
have been complemented with general direct tax reforms to strengthen incentives to 
work for all low earners, and targeted in-work tax credit programmes, mostly for 
families with children.  
2 Outcomes 
This section is designed to review some high-level outcomes, which might be thought 
of as “success measures”.  
Although not strictly an outcome, we first review how tax and benefit changes have 
altered financial work incentives, particularly for families with children, given that so 
much of the UK Government’s changes have been to tax credits for families with 
children. We then review broad changes in employment-related outcomes, and then 
examine trends in relative poverty. 
2.1  Financial work incentives  
Given that considerable attention has been focused with the UK Government on 
strengthening financial work incentives, it is appropriate to consider both how they vary 
across different family types, but also how they have changed in recent years.  
Table 2 and Table 3 focus more directly on the impact of tax and benefit changes 
since 1997/8 on financial work incentives: Table 2 shows the replacement rates of 
working parents, summarising some of the features of the changing distributions, and 
Table 3 shows how the distribution of marginal effective tax rates has changed.
15 Both 
                                                 
15 The replacement rate is defined as net income if out of work divided by net income in work. The marginal effective 
tax rate measures what fraction of a small rise in earnings is lost in income tax, employees’ social insurance 
contributions and foregone benefit and tax credit payments (it ignores employers’ social insurance contributions). 
14  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 sets of statistics have been calculated by holding constant the characteristics of the 
population, and considering the real impact of tax and benefit changes on these work 
incentive measures. 
Table 2 The impact of tax and benefit changes from 1997-2004 on the replacement 
rates of working parents 
  Replacement rates (%) 
  April 1997  April 2004  Change 
(ppt) 
Lone parents       
Mean 67.9  65.0  -2.9 
Median 71.9  65.9  -6.0 
25
th centile  55.8  52.3  -3.5 
75
th centile  81.9  80.4  -1.5 
Proportion whose rate rises  21.3% 
Proportion whose rate falls  56.7% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner does not work 
Mean 59.3  61.1  +1.8 
Median 62.6  65.5  +2.9 
25
th centile  41.3  45.3  +4.0 
75
th centile  80.6  79.5  -1.1 
Proportion whose rate rises  52.7% 
Proportion whose rate falls  26.6% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner does work 
Mean 59.2  62.5  +3.3 
Median 58.5  62.7  +4.2 
25
th centile  45.6  50.4  +4.8 
75
th centile  74.3  76.0  +1.7 
Proportion whose rate rises  53.8% 
Proportion whose rate falls  6.6% 
Notes: Excludes parents aged over 55 and self-employed. The row marked “25th centile” reports the replacement rate 
which is higher than 25 per cent of all replacement rates faced by that family type. The row marked “75th centile” 
reports the replacement rate which is higher than 75 per cent of all replacement rates faced by that family type. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from FRS 2002/03 and TAXBEN and taken from Brewer and Shephard (2004). 
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faced by working parents) 
  Effective marginal tax rates (%) 
  April 1997  April 2004  Change 
(ppt) 
Lone parents       
Mean 58.0  58.3  +0.3 
Median 72.5  69.0  -3.5 
Proportion whose rate rises  31.2% 
Proportion whose rate falls  46.9% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner not does work 
Mean 43.0  48.2  +5.2 
Median 35.7  42.1  +4.4 
Proportion whose rate rises  45.4% 
Proportion whose rate falls  21.0% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner does work 
Mean 32.5  36.8  +6.1 
Median 33.0  34.9  +1.9 
Proportion whose rate rises  39.4% 
Proportion whose rate falls  10.0% 
Notes: Excludes parents aged over 55 and self-employed. The row marked “25th centile” reports the marginal tax rate 
which is higher than 25 per cent of all marginal tax rate faced by that family type. The row marked “75th centile” 
reports the marginal tax rate which is higher than 75 per cent of all marginal tax rates faced by that family type. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from FRS 2002/03 and TAXBEN and taken from Brewer and Shephard (2004). 
 
The changes to the tax and benefit system between April 1997 and April 2004 imply 
that: 
•  The majority of lone parents now face a stronger reward to work than in 1997. 
•  The UK Government’s tax and benefit reforms have hardly changed the mean 
effective marginal tax rate faced by working lone parents, while the median 
effective marginal tax rate has fallen. More lone parents have experienced a 
strengthening of their incentive to progress than have experienced a worsening. 
•  Low-earning lone parents face stronger financial incentives to progress in the labour 
market, whilst medium- and high-earning lone parents face smaller financial 
incentives to progress (not shown in tables – see Brewer and Shephard 2004). 
•  A small number of couples with children face an increased financial reward for 
having one adult in work, but many more face a smaller financial reward. The same 
16  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 set of reforms since 1997 has weakened the financial reward to having a second 
earner. Together with the first effect, this means that a couple with children now 
faces a relatively stronger incentive, on average, to be a single earner couple, rather 
than to have two earners or none, than in 1997.  
•  The financial incentives to progress for the majority of workers in couples with 
children have worsened, with the mean effective marginal tax rate faced by 
individuals in couples with children 5 percentage points higher, thanks to the 
Government’s tax and benefit reforms. The increases in the median effective 
marginal tax rate have not been as large, however. 
2.2 Indicators  of  employment and worklessness  
Since 1997 the employment rate of women has increased from 67.2 per cent to 70.2 per 
cent (in 2006) with the majority of this increase concentrated between 1997 and 2001 
(Figure 3). Over the same period, the employment rate of men rose from 77.7 per cent 
to 78.8 per cent. Taken together, these increases imply an increase in the overall 
employment rate from 72.9 per cent to 74.6 per cent. This rise in the employment rates 
did not begin with the current Labour government, however: the employment rate has 
been rising since the recession of the early 1990s. The employment rate of men is still 
lower than it was in the 1970s, but that of women is substantially higher, and it is this 
increase that has helped raise the employment rate to its highest level since the 1970s. 
However, it is notable that the rise in employment has not been experienced amongst 
the low skilled (defined in this case as the 15 per cent of the working-age population 
with the least qualifications, usually none), for whom employment has fallen almost 
continuously since 1992: other groups usually thought of as being disadvantaged in the 
labour market (older working age individuals, lone parents, those with disabilities, 
ethnic minorities), by contrast, have seen their employment rates converge with the 
economy-wide average since 1997.
16  
                                                 
16 This discussion is based on the DWP’s Opportunity for All indicator 19, 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/ofa/indicators/indicator-19.asp . 
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Notes: Seasonally adjusted. The employment rate is calculated as the proportion of the population of working age 
(16-59 for women and 16-64 for men) who are in employment (working at least one hour in the reference week or 
temporarily away from a job). Low skilled defined as the 15 per cent of the working-age population with the lowest 
qualifications (most of whom have no qualifications). 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (Opportunity for All Indicator 18) based on original data from Office for 
National Statistics. 
 
There has been a clear shift in the focus of the Government’s welfare to work 
policies since 1997 from the unemployed to the inactive. This broadly reflects the 
Government’s perceived success in reforming active labour market policies for the 
unemployed. Figure 4 and Figure 5 therefore show unemployment and inactivity rates.  
Unemployment (ILO) is very low by historical standards, and the Government 
claims that its range of New Deals has been instrumental in achieving this. Inactivity 
rates, though, are broadly unchanged since 1997, with falling inactivity amongst women 
(mainly mothers) being offset by rising inactivity amongst men (mainly those in poor 
health). For men, the most common reason for inactivity is long-term sickness, followed 
by being in education, and those who retired before reaching the state pension age.
17 
Since 1997, the slight rise in the inactivity rate amongst men is explained by increases 
in the number of students, those retiring early, and other factors. For women, the single 
most important reason for inactivity is if they are looking after family or their home (in 
                                                 
17 See Office for National Statistics (2005). 
18  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 1997 this was cited as the reason by half of all inactive women). While the number of 
women who are economically inactive either through long-term sickness or because 
they are studying has increased since 1997, this has been more than offset by a decline 
in the number of women who care for family and/or their home. For both men and 
women, the proportion of the economically inactive who says they would like a job has 
declined since 1997 from 31.4 per cent to 25.5 per cent. 
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Notes: Seasonally adjusted. Unemployment is measured according to the ILO definition. This covers people who are: 
out of work, want a job, have actively sought work in the previous four weeks and are available to start work within 
the next fortnight; or out of work and have accepted a job that they are waiting to start in the next fortnight. 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 
 













































































All Male Female GDP growth (right axis)
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Notes: Seasonally adjusted. The inactivity rate is calculated as the proportion of the working age population who are 
neither employed nor unemployed (see figure notes for Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 
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targeted either exclusively or largely at families with children, and Figure 6 shows that 
employment rates have risen in four groups of adults in families with dependent 
children. Men in couples with children and women living in couples with a working 
partner have relative high rates, and both are higher now than in 1997, although there is 
a suggestion that the employment rate of mothers with working partners may have 
plateaued. However, more disadvantaged groups (lone parents and women in couples 
with a non-working partner) have seen much greater growth in employment. In 
particular, the employment rate of lone parents rose from 45.5 per cent to 56.5 per cent 
between 1997 and 2006 (2006 not shown in the graph). This has meant that the 
proportion of children in workless households – a key target of the labour Government 
when it came to power – has fallen from 18.5 per cent to 16.1 per cent since 1997 (not 
shown). 
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Lone parents
Women in couples: father works
Women in couples: father does not work
Fathers in couples
 
Source: From Brewer and Shephard (2004), based on quarterly Labour Force Survey data.  
 
2.3 Relative  poverty 
As discussed above, the UK Government has sought to reduce relative poverty, with 
tough targets for reductions amongst children (see Waldfogel 2007). 
Table 4 shows relative poverty rates (i.e., the proportion of the population living in 
households with less than 60 per cent of median equivalised income) since 1996/7. 
Other than a blip upwards in the last year, the trend over the past decade has been for 
20  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 falls in relative poverty, concentrated amongst children (and their parents) and 
pensioners. However, relative poverty rates amongst the remaining group – working-
age non-parents, is in 2005/6 at its highest ever level.  
Table 4 Relative poverty: percentage and number of individuals in households with 
incomes below 60 per cent of median AHC income 
 





  % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million 
1996-97  (GB)  34.1 4.3 29.1 2.9 26.6 3.3 17.2 3.5 25.3  14.0 
1997-98  (GB)  33.2 4.2 29.1 2.9 25.9 3.2 15.9 3.3 24.4  13.6 
1998-99  (GB)  33.9 4.3 28.6 2.9 26.3 3.2 15.5 3.2 24.4  13.6 
1999-00  (GB)  32.7 4.2 27.6 2.8 25.5 3.1 16.1 3.4 24.0  13.4 
2000-01  (GB)  31.1 3.9 25.9 2.6 24.7 3.0 16.2 3.4 23.1  13.0 
2001-02  (GB)  30.8 3.9 25.6 2.6 24.5 3.0 15.6 3.4 22.7  12.8 
2002-03  (UK)  29.8 3.9 24.2 2.5 24.1 3.0 16.5 3.7 22.4  13.1 
2003-04  (UK)  28.7 3.7 20.6 2.2 23.5 2.9 16.6 3.7 21.5  12.6 
2004-05  (UK)  28.4 3.6 17.6 1.9 23.0 2.9 16.1 3.6 20.5  12.1 
2005-06  (UK)  29.8 3.8 17.0 1.8 24.8 3.1 17.5 4.0 21.6  12.7 
Changes  (ppt)            
Total: 1996-97 to 
2005-06 
-4.3   -12.1   -1.8  (0.3)  -3.6  
Labour I: 1996-97 to 
2000-01 
-3.0  -3.2  -1.9  -1.0  -2.1  
Labour II: 2000-01 to 
2004-05 
-2.8  -8.3  -1.6   (-0.1)   -2.6  
Latest year: 2004-05 
to 2005-06 
(1.4)  (0.2)  (-0.6)  (-0.1)  1.8 0.2 1.4 0.3 1.1 0.7 
Notes: Reported changes may not equal the differences between the corresponding numbers due to rounding. 
Changes in parentheses are not significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. Changes in the number of 
individuals in poverty are only shown where these can be calculated consistently at the UK level. All figures are 
presented using the modified OECD equivalence scale.  
Source: From Brewer et al (2007b), based on Family Resources Survey, various years. 
 
Although the UK government has not seemed so concerned with overall inequality, it 
is instructive to review progress in this area.
18 The Gini coefficient in Great Britain rose 
from a value of around 0.25 in 1979 and reached a peak in the early 1990s of around 
0.34. Since the early 1990s, the changes in income inequality have been less dramatic: 
after falling slightly over the early to mid-1990s, inequality is effectively unchanged 
IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007  21 from its level in the mid 1990s, and remains at historically high levels (not shown 
here).
19 
3  A focus on some specific evaluations 
This section provides a closer look at some of the evaluations of the UK Government’s 
policies, describing econometric evaluations of WFTC, NDYP, and Pathways to Work. 
3.1  Working Families’ Tax Credit  
As one of the highest-profile changes to be made early on by the present UK 
Government, WFTC has been evaluated in a number of studies, and these are 
summarised in Brewer and Browne (2006). The review compared studies that had 
treated the introduction of WFTC as a natural experiment with one that used a structural 
model of labour supply to simulate ex post the impact of WFTC compared with its 
predecessor. In general, the results from both sets of studies are reassuringly similar 
(this can also be viewed as a validation of the structural model). 
Those studies that treated the introduction of WFTC as a natural experiment used 
difference-in-differences to estimate the impact of WFTC on the employment of 
families with children, making use of families without children as a control group. The 
raw data underlying this is shown in Figure 7: there is a clear convergence in the 
employment rate of lone parents with single adults without children which, prima facie, 
would suggest a positive employment effect of WFTC.
20 
One limitation of the difference-in-differences approach is that it cannot evaluate the 
impact of WFTC alone on labour market behaviour of families with children, because 
WFTC was introduced around the same time as other tax and benefit reforms that 
affected families with children (most of which were referred to in Section 2). 
Technically, those studies using difference-in-differences are evaluating the impact of 
                                                                                                                                               
18 One view is that the concern for relative poverty is a concern about inequality at the bottom, given that the poverty 
line is a fraction of median income. 
19 For past trends, see Goodman et al (1997). Note that other measures of inequality, such as the 90:10 ratio, have 
fallen since 1997/8: see Brewer et al (2007b). 
20 In fact, the convergence starts some time before October 1999, and the various studies reviewed by Brewer and 
Browne (2006) have different ways of accounting for this. 
22  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 all changes to the economic and policy environment that affected families with children 
differently from families without children: the most important of these other than 
WFTC was an increase in welfare benefits for families with children.  










































































Lone parents Single adults without children  
Notes: Not seasonally adjusted. The employment rate is calculated as the percentage of the population of working age 
(16-59 for women and 16-64 for men) who are in employment (working at least one hour in the reference week or 
temporarily away from a job). 
Source: Brewer and Shephard (2005), based on Labour Force Survey data, various years. 
 
Figure 8 Change in the budget constraint for a lone parent with two children under 5, 










































Note: Assumes hourly wage of GBP 4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability, no entitlement to child support 
and no childcare costs.  
 
Figure 8  and  Figure 9  illustrate this by showing the impact of tax and benefit 
changes between April 1999 and April 2002 (i.e. just before WFTC was introduced to 
just before CTC and WTC replaced it) on the budget constraints faced by a lone parent 
and by a mother in a couple respectively, both with two children aged under 5 and 
IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007  23 earning the 2002 minimum wage. Figure 8 makes clear that the income available to a 
lone parent who was not working increased substantially over this period, although by 
slightly less than the income available to a low-earning working lone parent. Figure 9 
shows that the income available to the family when the second earner does not work 
increased substantially, but the income available to the family when both adults worked 
increased by much less, consistent with a higher PTR (see Section 3.1).  
Figure 9 Change in the budget constraint for mother in couple with two children under 










































Notes: Assumes hourly wage of GBP 4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability and no childcare costs. The first 
earner in the couple is assumed to earn GBP 300 per week in 2002 prices. 
 
A structural model of labour supply tries to relate directly choices of whether and 
how much to work to the inherent financial incentives. If we remember that WFTC was 
both more generous and more slowly withdrawn than its predecessor, family credit 
(FC), (Section 2.2), then economic theory would predict different effects on different 
groups of parents. In particular, the increase in generosity would: 
•  for adults in workless families, lead to a stronger incentive to work 16 or more hours 
per week. We would therefore expect some currently workless families to 
participate as a result of this reform, and also some parents currently working less 
than 16 hours per week to move over the threshold.  
•  lead to a reduction in the number of two-worker families, when two-worker families 
found they needed to work a little less hard in order to achieve their pre-reform 
standard of living (an income effect away from work).  
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families depending on their income: 
•  For those previously claiming FC, there would be an increase in the returns to an 
extra hour’s work as a result of the lower withdrawal rate, leading to an increase in 
the number of hours worked (a substitution effect towards work).  
•  On the other hand, those who previously earned too much to claim FC but who were 
now eligible for WFTC would experience both an income and a substitution effect 
away from work. 
Table 5 The estimated impact of WFTC on lone mothers’ labour supply 
   After  WFTC       
   Not   
working 
Part-time Full-time  Total 
Before WFTC  Not working  49.6  2.4  2.8  54.7 
 Part-time  0.0 22.4 1.1 23.5 
 Full-time  0.0  0.4  21.4  21.8 
 Total  49.6  25.2  25.2  100.0 
Change in employment rate        5.1  
(0.68) 
Average change in weekly hours (all)        1.78  
(0.21) 
Average change in weekly hours (workers)        0.75  
(0.05) 
Average hours before WFTC (all)        12.42 
(0.20) 
Average hours before WFTC (workers)        27.4  
(0.16) 
Notes: Based on Table 4 in Brewer et al (2006). Estimated standard deviations given in brackets.  
 
Table 5 below shows the results of the simulations of WFTC alone on lone parents: 
employment is predicted to rise by 5.1 percentage points (from 45.3 per cent), and mean 
hours worked increases amongst workers (because the lower withdrawal rate increased 
incomes the most where the taper previously ended, usually corresponding to full-time 
work). However, the reforms implemented at the same time as the WFTC acted to 
reduce employment amongst lone parents, and a simulation of the set of changes 
actually introduced between 1999 and 2002 (not shown here) suggests that tax and 
benefit changes increased lone parent employment by 3.7 percentage points. 
Estimates of the overall impact on employment are given below: although the impact 
of WFTC on lone parents’ employment is relatively high, the impact on adults in 
couples with children is broadly neutral, and those reforms implemented at the same 
IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007  25 time as WFTC acted to reduce labour supply. The combined effect of 22,000 workers 
corresponds to less than 0.1 percentage point of the total workforce. 
Table 6 The Estimated impact of WFTC on total employment 







WFTC 75,000  -21,000  27,000  81,000 
WFTC and contemporaneous 
reforms 
55,000 -18,000 -15,000 22,000 
Notes: Based on Table 6 in Brewer et al (2006).  
 
Overall then, Brewer and Browne (2006) conclude that: 
“WFTC seems to have had the positive impacts on labour market participation from 
previously workless families that we would expect from economic theory. Furthermore, 
large negative effects on the labour market participation of second earners do not seem 
to have materialised.  
The increased generosity of the in-work credit system seems to have induced lone 
mothers to increase their participation in the labour market by around 5 percentage 
points between 1999 and 2002, and by a little less than this between 1999 and 2000. 
Much of this shift seems to have been into full-time work, and there also seems to have 
been a considerable shift among lone mothers from part-time to full-time work.  
Among adults in couples with dependent children, there is some evidence that WFTC 
reduced the proportions of two-earner households and of workless households, just as 
we would expect from economic theory, but with little overall effect on the proportion 
of adults in these households who work.” 
3.2  New Deal for Young People  
Two studies have looked in detail at the NDYP: Blundell et al (2004) looked at the 
programme in its early days, and de Giorgio (2005) examined whether the early impacts 
were stable over later cohorts.  
Blundell et al (2004) looked at the job assistance and wage subsidy element of the 
New Deal by examining flows off unemployed to jobs during the first four months of 
treatment (the “Gateway” period). They present a number of difference-in-differences 
estimators making use of two sources of differential eligibility. First, they look at the 
first areas to pilot the NDYP, where they are able to use young adults in similar areas 
26  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 not operating NDYP as a control group. Second, they look at a time when the 
programme ran nationally, and use slightly older (and therefore ineligible) adults as a 
control group.  
They conclude that the outflow rate to jobs has risen by about 20 per cent for young 
men as a result of the New Deal during its National Roll Out (i.e. five percentage points 
more men find jobs in the first four months of the New Deal above a pre-program level 
of twenty five percentage points).
21 The results are very similar when using regional 
comparison groups to when older, ineligible adults are used as the control group; this 
suggests that either equilibrium wage and substitution effects are not very strong or they 
broadly cancel each other out. 
The idea of using older, ineligible, adults as a control group was exploited further in 
De Giorgi (2005), who estimates a local average treatment effect (LATE) using a non-
parametric regression discontinuity. De Giorgi is also able to look at outcomes after a 
longer period of time (i.e. up to 12 months after starting the gateway, rather than 4 
months) and for a series of different cohorts. Reassuringly, the study also finds that the 
NDYP increases the proportion of unemployed men who move into work by about 6-7 
per cent, and that this impact is relatively stable over time.  
3.3 Pathways  to  work 
As is common with reforms piloted by the UK Department for Work and Pensions, the 
Pathways to Work policies were first introduced in a number of areas. As with the pilots 
of the NDYP, this naturally suggests a difference-in-differences evaluation, using 
claimants of incapacity benefits in non-pilot areas as a control group. 
Figure 10 applies this concept to administrative data, and shows that flows off 
incapacity benefits in the pilot areas were around 8 percentage points higher in the six 
months after starting a claim than in other areas, and that this effect occurred for both 
phases of pilots.  
In a more formal evaluation, Table 7 shows difference-in-differences estimates of the 
outcomes of interest for those who made an enquiry about claiming incapacity benefits 
                                                 
21 Women make up around 1 in 4 participants on NDYP; Blundell et al (2004) reports that the estimated impacts on 
women were smaller, less precisely estimated, and not robust to the choice of control group. 
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broad area of residence). 
The first column shows the early impact of the Pathways to Work pilots on the 
likelihood of being in paid work in the week before to the second wave interview 
(which is on average around 10½ months after the individual made the initial enquiry 
about claiming incapacity benefits). It shows that the early impact of the Pathways to 
Work policy was to increase the percentage of individuals doing paid work at that time 
by +9.4 percentage points. To place this in context, just under one-third (31.9 per cent) 
of those in the pilot areas in the period after the pilots had been implemented reported 
that they had been in paid work in the previous week, so the estimated impact suggests 
that in the absence of these pilots the employment rate in the last week would have been 
just 22.5 per cent (i.e. 31.9-9.4).
  
Figure 10 Six-month off-flow rate from incapacity benefits, by whether or not subject to 
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Source: Chart 2, Page 54 of House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2006). See also Blyth (2006). 
 
The estimates also suggest that the early effects of the pilots were to increase 
monthly earnings (by GBP 71.73, or over a quarter of total earnings in the pilot areas), 
reduce the likelihood that an individual was claiming incapacity benefits by 8 
percentage points, and reduce the percentage of respondents reporting that their health 
limited their daily activities. The pilots seem to have been more successful at helping 
older workers, and those who did not claim to have mental health problems. However, 
28  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 the authors stress that these are preliminary results covering a very short period of time, 
and more evidence on medium-run impacts are needed. 
Table 7 Difference-in-differences estimates of the early impact, all who made enquiry 
about claiming incapacity benefit 
 Paid  work  last 
week 
















Sample size  7,861  7,861  7,861  7,861 
Adjusted R
2 14.9%  13.8%  11.0%  34.2% 
Note: Unweighted. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes that the coefficient is statistically different from zero 
at the 1 per cent level; ** at the 5 per cent level and * at the 10 per cent level. Other variables controlled for include 
days since initial enquiry into claiming IB, broad area of residence, and a set of demographic variables, education 
level and initial health condition. 
Source: Derived from tables in chapter 4 of Adam et al (2006). 
 
4 Conclusions   
This paper has presented a tour of welfare reform in the UK over the past decade since 
the last change of government. It has presented the most important changes in active 
labour market policies, and to measures intended to strengthen financial incentives to 
work, including a minimum wage and parental subsidies for spending on work-related 
childcare.  
We have argued that the developments in the UK’s active labour market policies 
went in two broad phases: first, the Government sought to strengthen ALMPs for those 
individuals claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance, the benefit for those deemed to be 
unemployed, chiefly through various New Deal programmes. Second, the Government 
has turned to those individuals claiming benefits because they are not in work, but who 
traditionally have been viewed as inactive and therefore excused from job search 
activity: lone parents, and the sick and disabled (those claiming incapacity benefits). For 
both those groups, we have seen a gradual escalation in the requirements asked of 
benefit recipients, and in the focus on work, but this has stopped short of requiring job-
search (or similar activities) as a condition of receiving benefit. 
There have also been two phases of changes to taxes, benefits and financial work 
incentives. A set of changes in the late 1990s (including the WFTC) aimed to strengthen 
IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007  29 financial work incentives. But tax credits for families with children and in-work support 
for those without children were comprehensively altered in 2003 in a reform whose 
economic rationale is less clear. UK assessments of the merits of the 2003 reform have 
ever since been (rightly) dominated by operational concerns, and recent government 
policy on tax credits and financial work incentives is harder to infer than it was nearly a 
decade ago, except perhaps for an increased use of targeted and time-limited in-work 
payments. 
Blundell (2002) describes the goals of welfare reform as being to reduce government 
expenditure, increase the income of the poor (or low skilled) and increase labour supply; 
what varies across countries and over time is the relative weight given to these often 
contradictory goals. Where within this triangle can we place the current UK 
government? We would argue that the reforms to ALMPs are primarily motivated by 
the desire to reduce spending on welfare benefits, and to increase labour supply and 
thereby GDP.  
However, the aims of the Government’s changes to taxes and benefits are less clear 
cut. Although we have argued that there have been a set of changes to taxes and benefits 
designed deliberately to strengthen financial work incentives, the story is more 
complicated than this, for at least two reasons. First, the expansion of the WFTC and the 
expansion in the generosity of tax credits that followed have generally been weakening 
the financial work incentives of (potential) second earners in families with children. 
Second, as well as increasing the generosity of tax credits that are conditional on work, 
welfare benefits for families with children and (after 2003), the child tax credit (which 
is not work-contingent, and is means-tested with an extremely generous earnings 
disregard) have been increased too. In other words, the extent to which financial work 
incentives have been strengthened has been compromised by the Government’s desire 
to achieve broad reductions in relative child poverty. And it has learnt that, although 
welfare to work measures can help reduce child poverty, achieving short-run reductions 
in child poverty is only possible with increases to the generosity of benefits and tax 
credits available to low-income families with children, and in recent years, this has 
increasingly meant increases in income-related payments to families with children, with 
obvious implications for financial work incentives. 
30  IFAU – Welfare reform in the UK: 1997-2007 We have also summarised independent evaluations of three important UK policies: 
WFTC, NDYP and the newer Pathways to Work pilots. All have been deemed by the 
Government to have been “successful”. However, for WFTC and Pathways to Work, 
this is true only if “success” is defined as “has had a desirable impact on outcomes of 
interest”; to date only NDYP has been subject to a full cost and benefit analysis.  
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Comment by Peter Fredriksson
* 
This is a good summary of the welfare (related) reforms in the UK during the past 10 
years. The paper should be of great interest to the Swedish audience since many of the 
recent reforms in Sweden, introduced by the current liberal-conservative government, 
seem to have been inspired by the UK reforms. So if one is interested in projecting what 
might happen to policy in Sweden in the near future, this is a useful read.   
Although I am no expert on particular UK features, it is safe to say that the 
operations of the Swedish and UK labor market as well as of Swedish and UK welfare 
policies are very different. Thus, it is legitimate to ask: Should Swedish policy makers 
be inspired by the UK experience? The purpose of these comments is to try to shed 
some light on this question. I will try to outline the crucial differences in policy design. 
I will also outline what I think Swedish policy makers can learn from the UK 
evaluations that have been conducted.  
Since the UK government has been very active in this area, the paper by Brewer 
presents an extensive list of reforms. The evaluation evidence reported in his paper, 
however, pertains to three programs: the Working Families Tax Credit; the New Deal 
for Young People; and the Pathways To Work Program. The target groups for these 
programs are poor families, unemployed youths, and individuals on incapacity benefits. 
My comments will focus on these programs, their respective target groups, and similar 
policy initiatives in Sweden. 
Work incentives, youth unemployment, and disability in Sweden and the 
UK 
The design of the welfare systems in the UK and Sweden, respectively, differs 
considerably. Exaggerating just a little bit, the UK system is characterized by relief to 
poor families. The systems are typically means-tested and they are functions of 
household characteristics rather than individual characteristics. For instance, 
unemployment compensation is essentially an assistance program rather than an 
insurance program.  
 
* Peter Fredriksson is Professor and Director-General at the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Uppsala. The Swedish (tax and) transfer programs are typically based on individual 
characteristics. The programs are generally not means-tested. And eligibility for the 
insurance programs is tied to previous employment. The principal exception from this 
rule is the social assistance program which has the flavor of UK- and US-style 
assistance programs.  
The incentive problems generated by means-tested assistance programs are 
imminent. Hence, it should be no surprise that the UK and the US have a comparatively 
long history of tax credits or negative income taxes. In contrast, tax credits (in cash) in 
Sweden have virtually been non-existent. Still, one can think of publicly provided (and 
heavily subsidized) child-care (pre-schools) as a tax credit in kind to currently employed 
parents; see Kolm (2007).
1 
Despite these differences, the UK and Sweden share similar incentive problems, in 
particular at the low end of the wage distribution. Table A. 1 reports OECD calculations 
of the marginal effective tax rates of moving from unemployment or inactivity to 
employment at 2/3 of the average production worker wage for a single parent with two 
kids.  
Table A. 1 conveys the message that the incentive problems in the UK come from the 
assistance part of the system (social assistance, housing benefits and family benefits) 
while in Sweden, they are due to a comparatively generous unemployment insurance. 
The decompositions of the marginal effective tax rates show that the employment tax 
credit (the in-work benefit) substantially improves the incentive to move to 
employment: had it not been for the existence of the tax credit, the marginal effective 
tax rate would be close to 85 percent in the UK. 
                                                 
1 This has changed fairly recently. In 2001, the unemployed were also given the right to use public child-care. 
Moreover, from 2003, all parents of 4 and 5-year olds – independently of employment status – were given the right to 
a slot in public child-care free of charge. See Lundin et al (2007) for a description of these reforms.   
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Table A. 1 Incentive problems in Sweden and the UK: Marginal Effective Tax Rates 
(METRs) (Single parent with 2 children in 2002) 
     Sweden  UK 
Overall  91.1 58.9 
Component due to:     
unemployment benefits  80.0  21.6 
social assistance, housing- and family 
benefits 
4.0 47.3 





income tax and social security 
contributions 
7.1 14.8 
Overall  61.0 58.9 
Component due to:     
social assistance, housing- and family 
benefits 
32.9 68.8 





income tax and social security 
contributions 
28.1 14.8 
Note: METRs associated with move from unemployment/inactivity to employment at 2/3 of the average wage of a 
production worker. 
Source: OECD (2006). 
 
What about youth unemployment in the two countries? Table A. 2 reports the 
employment status for youths (aged 16-24) and prime-aged individuals (aged 25-54) in 
Sweden and the UK at two points in time, 1990 and 2006. 
Youths in Sweden spend a longer period of time in education than their UK 
counterparts. This was true already in 1990, i.e., prior to the severe economic crisis that 
hit Sweden in the early 1990s. Partly as a consequence of this crisis, there was a 
massive increase in the enrollment rates in upper-secondary and tertiary education in 
Sweden. This development is readily visible in Table A. 2, where the employment rate 
was reduced by 22 percentage points between 1990 and 2006. There has been a similar, 
but not as drastic, development in the UK: youth employment rates came down by some 
13 percentage points between 1990 and 2006.  
Despite the differences in education enrollment rates and the aggregate economic 
development between 1990 and 2006, the youth-to-prime-aged unemployment 
differential in the two countries was almost identical in 2006: the prevalence of 
unemployment is roughly 2.5 times higher among youths than among the prime-aged.  
Let us finally turn to the disability rates in the two countries. Figure A. 1 displays the 
number of early retirees as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 for Sweden and 
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population aged 15-64 for the UK.  
Table A. 2 Employment status by age in Sweden and the UK, percent of population, 






(1) relative to (2) 
  1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 
Sweden        
employment/population 66.1 44.0 91.6 84.6 0.72 0.52 
unemployment/population 3.2 11.9 1.2  4.7 2.67 2.53 
non-participation/population  30.7 44.1  7.2  10.7 4.26 4.12 
UK        
employment/population 70.1 57.3 79.1 81.2 0.89 0.71 
unemployment/population 7.9 9.3 4.9 3.5  1.61  2.66 
non-participation/population  22.0 33.4 16.1 15.3 1.37 2.18 
Notes: In so far as is possible, the data have been standardized by the OECD to be comparable over time and conform 
to ILO guidelines. 
Source: OECD (2005, 2007). 
 
As in many other OECD countries, there are trend increases in the share of the 
population claiming disability/early retirement. In Sweden, the share of men receiving 
the early retirement benefit increased from 5.5 percent in 1980 to 7.4 percent in 2004. In 
the UK, the share of men claiming disability rose from 4.3 percent in 1980 to 7.5 
percent in 2004. The increases in disability among females are much sharper: in 
Sweden, the disability rate increased from 5.4 percent (1980) to a staggering 11.1 
percent in 2004, while in the UK the increase was from 1.3 percent (1980) to 4.8 
percent (2004).  
In sum, despite the differences in the design of the welfare system and the 
organization of the labor market across the two countries, some broad labor market 
indicators look remarkably similar. Youth unemployment relative to prime-aged 
unemployment was almost identical in 2006; there have been stark increases in early 
retirement since 1980 in both countries, particularly among females; and the incentives 
to move from unemployment/inactivity to (low-wage) employment may be an issue in 
both countries. These problems are not unique to Sweden and the UK, but the 
similarities suggest a potential for learning from the recent UK experience.  
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Sweden (LHS) UK (RHS)
Women
 
Note: UK numbers for women refer to the number of claimants under the age of 60. 
Sources: Hesselius (2006) for Sweden; Brewer (2007) for the UK; data on the population aged 15-64 come from the 
OECD labor force statistics.  
 
To what extent are the UK results applicable to the Swedish context? 
My next purpose is to discuss to what extent the UK experience can shed some light on 
recent Swedish policy initiatives. The extent to which the results are transferable of 
course depends on the similarities between the reforms in the two countries. Ideally, we 
would also like to have a clear understanding of the effects of the components of the 
reform packages. Further, we would like to know what the alternatives were: What was 
the policy like for non-eligible (but comparable) groups? What was the previous policy 
for eligible groups? 
Employment tax credits 
The UK has a long history of in-work tax credits. The Working Family Tax Credit 
(WFTC), introduced in 1999, is a more generous version of the Family Credit 
introduced in 1988; see Blundell and Hoynes (2004). 
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introduction of the Employment Tax Deduction (ETD, Jobbskatteavdraget) in 2007.
2 
However, there are substantial differences between the systems in the UK and Sweden, 
as outlined in Table A. 3.  
Table A. 3 Employment tax credits in Sweden and the UK 
  Sweden (ETD)  UK (WFTC) 
Eligibility  All employed individuals.  Families with children. Must work at least 
16 hours per week. 
Phase-out  No phase-out.  Credit phased out when income exceeds a 
certain threshold. 
Policy change  Greater earnings disregard. 
Reduction of marginal tax rate by 3 
percentage points for earnings in the 
range SEK 110,000-314,000. 
Greater earnings disregard. 
Higher credits. 
Lower phase-out rate. 
Design features  Only income effects for individuals 
with earnings above SEK 314,000. 
Incentives to bunch at hours constraint(s). 
High marginal tax rates in phase-out region. 
Notes: ETD refers to the Employment Tax Deduction (Jobbskatteavdraget). The numbers refer to the rules as of 
2007. WFTC refers to the Working Family Tax Credit. The policy change is relative to the Family Credit. 
 
The WFTC is aimed at low-income families with children. There is a minimum 
hours constraint as is customary in UK welfare programs. And the credit is phased out 
which implies high marginal tax rates in the phase-out region.  
The ETD, on the other hand, is individually based and there is no phase-out; thus, 
there are only (negative) income effects on labor supply for those above the upper 
earnings limit. 
What are the results of the UK evaluations? The positive effects on labor supply can 
only be found for lone mothers. The extensive margin (participation) is more elastic 
than the intensive margin (hours worked conditional on working). Of course, basic labor 
supply theory suggests that the extensive margin should be more elastic, since only the 
substitution effect (of an increase in the tax credit) is relevant along the extensive 
                                                 
2 The ETD was made more generous in 2008. There are some minor predecessors to the ETD. For instance, at some 
points, employed individuals have been allowed to routinely deduct a fixed (and small) sum from the earnings which 
are subject to income taxes. 
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margin. For the intensive margin, there is also an off-setting income effect which lowers 
the hours response.  
What does this tell us regarding the recent Swedish reform? We can be fairly 
confident (from UK and US evidence) that participation (employment) will increase, 
i.e., previously non-employed individuals will move into employment to a greater 
extent. However, in principle, we cannot determine the effect on hours worked for low-
wage individuals who were already working (in 2005, roughly 58 percent of the 
individuals aged 20-64 were in the relevant earnings range where marginal tax rates 
were reduced). Moreover, the top-earners (24 percent were above the upper earnings 
limit in 2005) should be expected to reduce labor supply since they get a lump-sum 
income transfer due to the design of the reform. 
Nevertheless, I would project that total labor should supply increase as a result of the 
Swedish ETD. However, this is an expensive reform since there is no phase-out region. 
And there is reason to question the efficiency of the reform since highly skilled 
individuals have the incentive to reduce their labor supply. 
Programs for unemployed youths 
The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was piloted prior to its nationwide 
introduction in 1998. Prior to NDYP, there was no specific program for youths; rather, 
they had access to the same kind of active labor market policies as older unemployed 
individuals.
3 
By contrast, Sweden has a fairly long history of youth programs. Specific programs 
targeted towards youths were introduced in 1983. Starting in 1998, these have come in 
the form of an “early intervention program”, where youths were guaranteed treatment, 
by the local government, within 100 days. Youth programs were recently reformed (as 
of 1 December, 2007). The responsibility for running the program was transferred to the 
Labor Market Board and the contents of the program were changed.   
Table A. 4 offers the details about youth programs in Sweden and the UK. There are 
some differences worth noting. Both versions of Swedish youth programs have a shorter 
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moved the Swedish program closer to the UK program in the sense that there are now 
two treatment phases with an initial period of intensified job search assistance.   
Table A. 4 Youth programs in Sweden and the UK 
 Sweden  UK 
  Old policy  New policy   NDYP 
Eligible group  Aged 18-24  Aged 16-24  Aged 18-24 
Waiting period  100 days  3 months  6 months 




Local gov’t jobs 
On-the-job training 
Job search assistance 
(max 3 months) 
Job search assistance 
(max 4 months) 
Treatment  
Phase 2 
(Same as phase 1)  Education 
On-the-job training 
Education 
Subsidized jobs etc. 
Notes: “Old policy” refers to the youth program that existed prior to 1 December, 2007. It is really a combination of 
two programs: Kommunala ungdomsprogram (18-19 year-olds) and Ungdomsgarantin (20-24 year-olds). There are 
some differences between these two programs but the essence of them is basically the same. “New policy” refers to 
the youth program introduced on 1 December 2007.     
 
The evaluations of the NDYP have utilized two strategies: first, they have compared 
(changes in) outcomes for youths in the pilot areas to outcomes for youths in non-pilot 
areas; second, they have utilized the inherent age discontinuity in the program. Note, 
also, that the UK evaluations are restricted to the individuals who have entered 
treatment. Thus, any pre-treatment effects will not be captured by the estimates.  
What does the UK evidence tell us? The initial evaluation (Blundell et al 2004) 
focused on treatment phase 1 (i.e. job search assistance) and concluded that the 
proportion of unemployed finding a job within the first 4 months increased by 5 
percentage points. A later evaluation (De Giorgi 2005) has estimated the combined 
effect of both treatment phases coming up with more or less the same number. This 
suggests to me that the initial job search assistance phase is key – the second phase, per 
se, does not bring additional employment.  
                                                                                                                                               
3 Note, though, that active labor market policies are substantially more extensive in Sweden than in the UK; so, even 
if Sweden were to implement the NDYP, the treatment effects should differ since the alternatives differ across the 
two countries. 
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Carling and Larsson (2005) as well as Forslund and Skans (2006) have evaluated the 
old Swedish policy. Figure A. 2 comes from Forslund and Skans. They utilize the age 
discontinuity strategy alluded to above. Individuals aged 22-24 are treated individuals 
whose outcomes are related to the outcomes of 25-year-olds.  
Figure A. 2 Differential survival rates in unemployment by age, difference relative to 
25-year-olds 
 
Source: Forslund and Skans (2006). 
 
The figure suggests that individuals aged 24 escape to employment at a faster rate 
than the comparison group.
4 Interestingly, this effect is entirely driven by a higher 
escape rate prior to program entry. Indeed, had the comparison started after 100 days of 
registration, the conclusion would have been that the program has a negative effect on 
the employment prospects of the treated.
5 A possible interpretation of the pre-program 
effect is that it is due to “deterrence”.
6  
What should one make of the new Swedish policy, given the previous Swedish and 
UK evidence? It seems to me that the reform is an advance on previous policies, 
certainly for those actually entering treatment. The new policy emphasizes job search 
assistance which, according to the UK evidence, is mainly contributing to the positive 
                                                 
4 I focus on the 24-year-olds since they are most similar to the 25-year-olds (the comparison group). 
5 One should be slightly careful here since such an analysis may be biased because of differential selection prior to 
program entry. 
6 Some other papers report evidence suggesting that there is a threat effect of active labor market policies; see, e.g., 
Black et al (2003). 
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if job search assistance is viewed as a more attractive option for unemployed youths 
than the various types of local government programs that existed prior to the reform.  
Initiatives for the disabled and long-term absentees 
Starting in the fall of 2003, the UK government has piloted a program called Pathways 
to Work (PTW). The PTW will be implemented across the UK in 2008. 
The Swedish government sketched a set of reforms for individuals on long-term sick 
leave in the budgetary proposal for 2008. Although the full set of proposals is not 
known at the time of writing, it seems that there are some commonalities across the two 
countries. The focus of this reform proposal is to reduce the inflow into disability 
retirement. 
Table A. 5 presents a summary of the reform proposal in Sweden and the UK PTW-
program. For both countries, it is hard to assess what is really new. For the UK, the fact 
that there are regular and mandatory work-focused interviews is new. The previous 
policy required a one-off work-focused interview; further interviews were voluntary on 
the part of the claimant. The return to work credit is more generous than previous tax 
credits, but note that disabled individuals had access to a more generous Working Tax 
Credit before the introduction of the PTW. Prior to the PTW, individuals on incapacity 
benefits had access to programs offered within the New Deal for Disabled Persons, so 
the extent of the real change is not clear. The new rehabilitation programs are 
supposedly “new”, but I believe that the verdict is still out on the efficacy of these 
programs.
7 
                                                 
7 This is based on my reading of Department for Work and Pensions (2002). Brewer (2008) gives a somewhat 
different impression. 
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Table A. 5 Programs targeted towards long-term absentees/disabled in Sweden and 
the UK 
 Sweden  UK   
  Reform proposal  PTW 
Target group  Individuals at risk of entering early 
retirement 
New claimants of incapacity benefits 
Tests of work  
capacity 
Introduction of specific time points 
when work-capacity is assessed (3 
and 6 months) 
Stricter medical guidelines for 
assessing work-capacity 
Mandatory monthly work-focused 
interviews during first 6 months 
Financial  
incentives 
Lower replacement rate after 1 year 
of sick leave 
Employers' wage costs are 
subsidized by 50% if they hire an 
individual who has been on “sick 
leave” for at least 1 year 
Return to work credit 
Labor market  
programs 




Rehabilitation guarantee. Additional 
resources for rehabilitation 
conditional on an agreement 
between the Social Insurance Board 
and the county councils 
New work-focused rehabilitation 
programs offered in conjunction with 
NHS 
Notes: The information on the Swedish reform proposal comes from the budgetary proposal for 2008; see prop. 
2007/08:1. Some components of the Swedish proposal have been left out; for instance, the proposal opens up for 
private providers in facilitating the return to work process (something that existed prior to the PTW in the UK). 
 
For Sweden, it seems that many of the proposals involve a structuring of the 
rehabilitation process. For instance, according to the current rules, the work-capacity of 
the individuals should be continuously assessed (at least on paper). The new thing in 
this respect is the introduction of specific time points, prior to which certain actions 
should be taken. The introduction of financial incentives is to some extent new. The 
employment subsidy appears to be the main component, where the proposal has doubled 
the wage subsidy available to those who hire someone on long-term sick leave.
8 The 
proposal involves no changes to the specific programs targeted towards the disabled 
                                                 
8 Note, though, that individuals continuously on sick leave were not eligible for employment subsidies prior to 2007. 
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rehabilitation.  
The UK piloting approach allows for a differences-in-differences strategy. The 
evidence reported in Brewer refers to the impact some 10 months after the initial claim 
of incapacity benefits. At this time horizon, rehabilitation initiatives are probably less 
relevant (if they do have beneficial effects). The estimates suggest that the probability of 
being in paid work increased by 9 percentage points and that there is a mirroring 
reduction in the probability of receiving incapacity benefits. There is no way of 
distinguishing what component of the policy package that drove this effect, although I 
would suspect that it is mostly due to a combined effect of mandatory work-focused 
interviews and the return-to-work credit. Since it is not possible to determine what 
drives the overall effect in the UK example, it is very hard to judge whether the 
estimates are relevant for the recent reform proposal in Sweden.  
Concluding remarks 
In these comments, I have made an attempt to judge whether the UK experience is 
relevant for Sweden. This is an important exercise, since it seems quite likely that the 
current liberal-conservative Swedish government has looked at the UK experience when 
designing its reform package. 
Of the three areas covered here, I think the evidence on the NDYP is most relevant 
for Sweden. I am more reluctant to draw inference from the evidence on UK tax credits, 
both because of the differences in crucial design features across the two countries and 
because of the fundamental differences in tax and transfer policies in Sweden and the 
UK. Finally, the UK evidence on programs for the disabled may or may not be relevant 
– I simply do not have enough information to tell. 
Swedish policy makers should learn from the UK habit of piloting new programs. 
This is very useful as those implementing the programs get the possibility to fine-tune 
them before they are rolled out nationally. Further, given a suitable choice of pilot areas, 
piloting provides fruitful avenues for evaluation.    
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